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Abstract We study the impact of firm and industry
characteristics on small firms’ capital structure,
employing a proprietary database containing financial
statements of Dutch small and medium-sized enter-
prises (SMEs) from 2003 to 2005. The firm charac-
teristics suggest that the capital structure decision is
consistent with the pecking-order theory: Dutch SMEs
use profits to reduce their debt level, and growing
firms increase their debt position since they need more
funds. We further document that profits reduce in
particular short-term debt, whereas growth increases
long-term debt. We also find that inter- and intra-
industry effects are important in explaining small
firms’ capital structure. Industries exhibit different
average debt levels, which is in line with the trade-off
theory. Furthermore, there is substantial intra-industry
heterogeneity, showing that the degree of industry
competition, the degree of agency conflicts, and the
heterogeneity in employed technology are also impor-
tant drivers of capital structure.
Keywords Capital structure  Panel data 
Pecking-order theory  Trade-off theory  SME 
Industry effects
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1 Introduction
The capital structure choice is one of the most
important decisions faced by firm management.
While many studies tackle the capital structure
decision, most empirical work deals with large
publicly listed firms which often have several types
of securities traded (see Frank and Goyal 2008 for a
recent review). Small unlisted firms, however, make
up for more than 90% of all existing firms, and are
the engine of growth in most economies. In this paper
we study firm and industry characteristics that
determine the capital structure of small unlisted firms
in The Netherlands. The capital structure decision of
small firms comes closest to the standard textbook
case which considers the choice between debt and
equity. Indeed, small Dutch firms typically only
decide from which banks to borrow and do not face
other complicating issues such as the choice between
private and public debt, or which type of securities to
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issue. While previous studies on industry effects
focus on larger firms, studying industry characteris-
tics for small firms is particularly important as small
firms are more likely to be single-line businesses.
We exploit a large and detailed proprietary
database with financial statements of Dutch SMEs
from 2003 to 2005. The advantage of this proprietary
dataset over publicly available datasets is that it
contains detailed information on many small firms.
Indeed, firms often only report partial information to
public datasets, whereas they are requested to provide
more details to their financiers. Another unique
feature of the database is its sheer size. In our
analysis, we use an unbalanced panel that contains
about 100,000 firm-year observations, covering eight
different industries over 3 years. The dataset contains
many very small firms, which distinguishes this study
further from earlier SME capital structure studies that
have medium-sized firms in their data (Michaelas
et al. 1999; Sogorb-Mira 2005). SME capital struc-
ture has been investigated before for other European
countries, for example the UK (Michaelas et al.
1999), Spain (Sogorb-Mira 2005), and Belgium
(Heyman et al. 2008). Dutch SMEs have been
considered together with a number of other European
countries in a study of Hall et al. (2004).
The Dutch case is particularly interesting, because
compared with the USA or the UK, financial markets
are much less accessible for small businesses. Banks
are the major financiers for SMEs, and the banking
sector in The Netherlands is among the most
concentrated in the world (see, e.g., Cetorelli and
Gambera 2001). Our dataset enables us to investigate
whether the empirical results in The Netherlands are
different from the results in other countries and from
those of large firms. An additional interesting feature
of our dataset is that we can test the impact of both
firm and industry characteristics on SME capital
structure (see also Michaelas et al. 1999). This allows
us to investigate the importance of the pecking-order
theory and trade-off theory both in general and for
individual industries. Previous studies such as Bala-
krishnan and Fox (1993), Bradley et al. (1984), and
MacKay and Phillips (2005) have found various
impacts of inter- and intra-industry effects for large
publicly listed firms. In line with Michaelas et al.
(1999), we study inter-industry effects of capital
structure for unlisted SMEs, but link them more
closely to the importance of the pecking-order theory
and trade-off theory. Furthermore, we investigate
intra-industry heterogeneity in capital structure.
Our findings can be summarized as follows. First,
the firm characteristics show that the capital structure
decision for Dutch SMEs is consistent with the
predictions of the pecking-order theory. This is in line
with previous findings for, for example, the Spanish
market (see Sogorb-Mira 2005). SMEs use profits to
reduce their debt level, since they prefer internal
funds over external funds. However, if a firm is
growing, it increases its debt position, since it needs
more funds. Furthermore, we document that profits
affect in particular short-term debt, whereas growth
affects long-term debt. This implies that, when
internal funds are depleted, long-term debt is next
in the pecking order. We also document that short-
term debt is more expensive and can be amortized
easily.
Second, we find that SMEs with collateral more
easily attract external finance. Moreover, we docu-
ment that intangible assets and net debtors, which are
often considered poor collateral, have a positive
effect on the long-term debt level, suggesting that
banks are able to employ these assets in their loan-
granting decisions. In addition, Dutch SMEs have a
relatively large amount of long-term debt which is
more risky for lenders.
Third, we find that long-term assets are financed
with long-term debt, which is consistent with the
maturity-matching principle (see, e.g., Mitchel 1991).
In addition, larger firms have relatively more long-
term debt, while the impact of firm size on short-term
debt is insignificant. These results are in contrast
with, for example, Van der Wijst and Thurik (1993),
who report that, if total debt is taken into account,
most firm characteristics have insignificant effects,
since the effects of long-term debt and short-term
debt cancel out.
Finally, we document that SME capital structure
exhibits both significant inter- and intra-industry
variation. The inter-industry variation is in line with
the trade-off theory, which suggests that industries
may have different target capital structures. We
further compare the role of firm characteristics across
different industries and find support for the pecking-
order theory for almost all industries. The only
exception is the catering and leisure sector, where
more profitable firms have larger debt, suggesting
that the trade-off theory dominates for this sector. We
432 H. Degryse et al.
123
further find substantial intra-industry variation, as the
firm fixed effects within an industry explain a
substantial fraction of the variation in capital
structure.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. In Sect. 2, we review the literature and
formulate hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data as
well as the econometric model. We discuss the
empirical results in Sect. 4. Finally, Sect. 5
concludes.
2 Literature review and empirical propositions
2.1 Theory
Modigliani and Miller (1958) argue that capital
structure is irrelevant for firm value. In the vast
stream of literature following Modigliani and Miller,
the irrelevance proposition has been rejected, but a
conclusive answer on what factors drive capital
structure has not yet been provided. Several theories
explain capital structure (for a review see, e.g., Frank
and Goyal 2008). The first theory is the pecking-order
theory (POT) (Myers and Majluf 1984; Myers 1977,
1984), which builds upon asymmetric information
between managers and investors. Firms prefer fund-
ing sources with the lowest degree of asymmetric
information, since borrowing costs increase when
obtaining funds from outside lenders who do not have
complete borrower information. The POT implies
that firms opt first for internally generated funds (a
form of inside equity), then for debt, and only as a
last resort, for outside equity. This theory also states
that there is no optimal debt-to-equity ratio.
The second theory is the trade-off theory (TOT),
which argues that a firm chooses the optimal capital
structure by balancing the tax benefits of debt and the
costs of financial distress (see, e.g., Brennan and
Schwartz 1978; DeAngelo and Masulis 1980; Brad-
ley et al. 1984). These costs increase with the degree
of leverage. Finally, the market timing theory of
Baker and Wurgler (2002) states that management
raises equity in hot equity markets but issues debt in
cold equity markets. However, for our research, the
TOT and POT are most relevant, as SMEs are
typically privately held. Our empirical tests will
therefore focus on these two theories.
2.2 Leverage factors
We discuss subsequently the firm and industry deter-
minants of leverage as well as their relation to both
capital structure theories. We summarize the predic-
tions in Table 1 and formulate explicit hypotheses.
2.2.1 Firm characteristics
Firm size is considered as an inverse proxy of
bankruptcy costs. The TOT predicts a positive
relationship between firm size and leverage, because
size is assumed as a proxy for earnings volatility and
larger firms are generally more diversified and show
less volatility (Fama and French 2002). Less volatile
earnings reduce indirect bankruptcy costs such that
firms can take on more debt. The POT also predicts a
positive relationship between firm size and leverage,
because more diversification and less volatile earn-
ings mitigate problems of asymmetric information.
This decreases the costs of debt compared with other
sources of finance. Several empirical studies find a
positive relationship for both large firms and SMEs
(Van Dijk 1997; De Jong 1999; Fama and French
2002; Michaelas et al. 1999; Cassar and Holmes
2003; Sogorb-Mira 2005; Hall et al. 2004). Our first
empirical proposition (or hypothesis) based on the
TOT and POT is:
Proposition P1 Larger firms have higher leverage.
The effect of firm size on short-term debt has been
empirically verified by several authors. Michaelas
et al. (1999) and Hall et al. (2004) report a negative
effect, even though the effect on total leverage is
positive. Sogorb-Mira (2005) finds similar effects for
Table 1 Capital structure theory and expected sign on lever-






Firm size ? ?
Collateral ? ?
Profitability ? -
Growth opportunities - ?
Industry characteristics
Fixed effects Significant ?
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total debt but no significant effects of firm size on
short-term debt. Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2006) find
that size increases the maturity of lines of credit. The
high business risk and informational opacity increase
if firms are smaller. Small firms then have to rely
more on short-term debt. We therefore formulate the
following two propositions based upon previous
empirical work:
Proposition P1a Firm size is positively related to
long-term debt.
Proposition P1b Firm size is negatively related to
short-term debt.
The firm’s asset structure is a second factor
determining capital structure. Asset tangibility is
expected to be positively correlated with debt, as it
provides collateral. Collateral reduces agency prob-
lems with debtholders and reduces bankruptcy costs
and credit risk. Therefore, the TOT predicts a positive
relationship between collateral and leverage. Collat-
eral also mitigates information asymmetry problems
such that also the POT implies a positive correspon-
dence. De Jong (1999) confirms the positive relation-
ship between tangible assets and leverage, whereas
Titman and Wessels (1988) report a negative, though
not statistically significant, relationship. The informa-
tion asymmetry argument is particularly relevant for
SMEs, as they are more opaque than large firms. Small
firms often do not have to provide (audited) financial
statements or do not issue traded securities. For these
reasons, collateralized lending is important for SMEs.
Michaelas et al. (1999) and Sogorb-Mira (2005) find a
positive effect of tangible assets on leverage for SMEs.
Hall et al. (2004) report a small positive relationship
for Dutch SMEs. Therefore, our proposition regarding
asset structure is:
Proposition P2 Collateral has a positive effect on
debt ratio.
Collateral may affect short-term and long-term
debt differently. Previous work documents a negative
relationship for short-term debt and a positive one for
long-term debt (Van der Wijst and Thurik 1993;
Michaelas et al. 1999; Hall et al. 2004; Sogorb-Mira
2005). Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2006) argue that
collateral and maturity are substitutes in reducing
agency problems. We therefore supplement proposi-
tion 2 with:
Proposition P2a Collateral has a stronger positive
effect on long-term debt than on short-term debt.
Liquidity is a second dimension of a firm’s asset
structure. Illiquid firms are restricted in attracting
debt, as bankruptcy costs are high. The TOT then
predicts a positive relationship between liquidity and
leverage. We employ ‘‘net debtors’’ as a proxy for
liquidity. It is particularly relevant for SMEs because
small firms generally put less pressure on collecting
payments from customers. Late payments are often
financed by trade credit. In the pecking order, trade
credit may be on top of the preference list. Suppliers
grant trade credit as they may have superior infor-
mation compared with banks regarding their custom-
ers’ liquidity. This alleviates problems of asymmetric
information (Berger and Udell 2006). Of course,
firms cannot delay late payments to creditors beyond
a certain point. It can therefore be expected that
short-term debt increases if a firm suffers from late
payments. Michaelas et al. (1999) report positive
coefficients of net debtors on short-term and long-
term debt, although the effect on long-term debt was
negligible. These results give rise to the next
propositions:
Proposition P3 Net debtors is positively related to
the debt level.
Proposition P3a Net debtors has a stronger posi-
tive relationship with short-term debt than with long-
term debt.
Profitability is another determinant of capital
structure. The free cash flow theory of Jensen
(1986) states that more debt disciplines the manager
if profits increase. A positive relationship between
debt and profitability is then expected. The POT
predicts the opposite effect of profitability on
leverage. Retained earnings are on top of the
preference list to finance investments, so higher
profits reduce the necessity to raise debt. Studies
using large-company data find a negative relationship
between debt and profitability (Titman and Wessels
1988; Van Dijk 1997; Fama and French 2002). The
POT also applies to SMEs, whereas agency conflicts
between managers and shareholders should be less
relevant (see also Ang 1992). Studies on SMEs also
find a negative impact of profitability on debt (Van
der Wijst and Thurik 1993; Michaelas et al. 1999;
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Sogorb-Mira 2005). Therefore, our next proposition
is:
Proposition P4 Profitability is negatively related
to leverage.
Profitability may differentially impact short-term
and long-term debt. Michaelas et al. (1999) find a
larger effect of profitability on long-term debt
compared with short-term debt. They argue that
SMEs prefer short-term financing and that long-term
debt will be reduced if internal funding is available.
On the other hand, short-term debt can be amortized
more easily and carries higher interest rates. This
suggests a stronger influence on short-term debt,
which is validated by several SME studies (Van der
Wijst and Thurik 1993; Cassar and Holmes 2003;
Sogorb-Mira 2005). Therefore, proposition P4 is
supplemented as follows:
Proposition P4a Profitability has a greater nega-
tive impact on short-term debt than on long-term
debt.
Agency problems between managers and debt-
holders are particularly relevant for firms with growth
opportunities. Myers (1977), for example, argues that
managers underinvest because equity holders may not
earn a profit on some projects with positive net
present value (NPV) if interest payments are high.
The TOT predicts a negative relationship between
growth opportunities and leverage. Myers (1977),
however, models that short-term debt could over-
come the underinvestment problem and therefore is
positively affected by growth opportunities. Accord-
ing to the POT, growth opportunities and leverage are
expected to be positively related. Firms with growth
opportunities are more likely to raise new funds than
are firms without growth possibilities (De Jong 1999).
Growth opportunities for larger or publicly listed
firms are proxied by research and development
(R&D) expenses, the market-to-book ratio or intan-
gible assets. Titman and Wessels (1988), Fama and
French (2002), and Graham and Harvey (2001) report
a negative relationship between their proxies of
growth opportunities and leverage. Another explana-
tion for a negative link is that assets needed for future
growth are poor collateral. Studies on SMEs find
evidence for a positive relationship of leverage with
growth opportunities. Growth opportunities in these
studies are proxied by intangible assets or growth in
sales or assets. Sogorb-Mira (2005) reports a stronger
positive effect on long-term debt, but a negative
impact on short-term debt. Michaelas et al. (1999)
find a positive impact on short-term debt.
Proposition P5 Growth opportunities positively
relate to leverage.
We also briefly discuss expected impacts from
taxation. Modigliani and Miller (1963) argue that
firms prefer debt financing because of the tax shield,
so a positive relationship between the tax rate and
leverage can be expected. Studies focusing on SMEs,
however, find a negative relationship for SMEs and
argue that the tax status of a company is not
informative. Sogorb-Mira (2005) show that SME
managers choose other instruments to lower their tax
payments, whereas Jordan et al. (1998) claim that
taxes lower retained earnings. The total tax burden of
a firm is not solely determined by the tax rate but by
taxable income as well. Some authors argue that this
is even more important than testing the tax rate itself
(Van Dijk 1997). Interest payments reduce taxable
income, but other items can do the same. These
nondebt tax shields could substitute for the tax shield
of debt (Titman and Wessels 1988). Hence, a
negative relationship with debt ratio is expected. In
the empirical section below, we also test for tax
effects, but we do not formulate an explicit
proposition.
2.2.2 Industry characteristics
We now turn to formulating explicit propositions on
industry effects. We first focus on inter-industry
effects. The TOT posits that firms target an optimal
leverage ratio, and this optimal leverage may differ
across industries. This can be captured by industry
fixed effects. The POT, in contrast, does not deliver a
clear prediction with respect to industry fixed effects.
However, to the extent that there are unobservable
factors that are correlated within an industry, then
also industry fixed effects could be significant (see
also Cole 2008). Finally, the TOT and the POT could
also be of differential importance across industries.
For example, the degree to which propositions P1–
P5, particularly propositions P4 and P5, apply may be
different. The empirical investigation of inter-indus-
try effects deals with the question of the extent to
which capital structure variation between firms is
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explained by industry characteristics compared with
firm characteristics. Balakrishnan and Fox (1993), for
example, find that 52% of capital structure variation
is explained by firm effects and 11% by inter-industry
differences. MacKay and Phillips (2005) report
similar percentages for firm and inter-industry
effects. Michaelas et al. (1999) use industry fixed
effects to test whether industry effects have an
influence on SME capital structure. They find signif-
icant industry fixed effects, but the impacts are
primarily on short-term debt. We therefore formulate
the following two propositions:
Proposition P6 Industry fixed effects are signifi-
cant determinants of leverage.
Proposition P7 The relevance of empirical propo-
sitions P1–P5 differs across industries.
Next to heterogeneity across industries, leverage
could also exhibit intra-industry heterogeneity. This
may be driven, for example, by industry competi-
tion, the degree of agency conflicts, and the heter-
ogeneity in employed technology. The degree of
competition, for example, determines whether a firm
is close to the optimal degree of leverage within an
industry. In particular, in industries with low com-
petition, firms face less pressure to be close to the
optimal target, whereas in industries with high
competition, firms can only survive by choosing
the optimal degree of leverage in order to minimize
costs (Leibenstein 1966; MacKay and Phillips 2005).
Agency conflicts resulting from conflicting objec-
tives between shareholders and managers may
determine firms’ capital structures; for example,
managers could choose too low debt ratios in order
to protect their human capital (Fama 1980) or to
avoid pressure from interest payments (Jensen 1986).
Managers may take on too much leverage in order to
signal their quality or to decrease takeover attempts
(e.g., Harris and Raviv 1991 or Stulz 1988). We then
expect that, in industries without agency conflicts,
there should be less leverage dispersion. Finally,
Maksimovic and Zechner (1991) model that indus-
tries with more technological dispersion exhibit
more capital structure dispersion. We do not formu-
late a hypothesis on intra-industry effects, as our
dataset only contains limited information on com-
petition, technological dispersion, or agency prob-
lems within an industry.
3 Description of the data and research
methodology
3.1 Dataset
Our dataset has been kindly provided by Rabobank, a
large Dutch financial institution. The database con-
tains financial statements of the bank’s SME clients.
Many clients, particularly if they have a loan, are
required to provide a detailed balance sheet and
income statement every year. A potential concern is
that our data is self-selected, as it comes from one bank
only. We believe that the dataset is highly represen-
tative for the Dutch setting for several reasons. First,
Rabobank is the largest player in this SME segment
with a market share of 39% (in 2008) and is active in
all industries and provinces. This should reduce the
potential for selection issues to impact on our sample.
It is also important to mention that, when firms have
relationships with several banks, including Rabobank,
these firms are part of the dataset. This further
increases the relevance of the dataset at hand. Second,
one could argue to use a publicly available dataset
based on Amadeus (i.e., REACH). We compared the
descriptive statistics of REACH with those of our
dataset and find that our dataset contains relatively
more small firms, as it includes information on firms
which by law do not have to submit detailed balance
sheet data. Therefore, this self-selected sample allows
greater learning about the capital structure of small
firms in comparison with using REACH.
Firms are included in the dataset when they have
less than € 20 million annual sales over the period
2002–2005, and when they report to the bank at least
two annual accounts within this period.1 We therefore
have an unbalanced panel. While the bank is active in
all industries, the dataset does not contain firms active
within the agricultural sector or the energy and
utilities sector. Additionally, we removed financial
firms as is common in capital structure studies, as
financial institutions face regulatory capital require-
ments and may inherently have a different capital
structure. Moreover, associations (e.g., sport clubs,
political organizations, labor unions) were removed,
because they do not have commercial activities and
1 In the analysis, all observations for 2002 were lost because
they were needed to calculate the growth variable, as discussed
below.
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often rely on governmental funding. Finally, we
removed all entries with data errors, or which take
values which are unreasonable on economic grounds,
and drop observations with extreme values such as
very large firms. Our final dataset contained 99,031
firm-year observations. The number of observations
in 2005 decreased substantially (by more than 30%)
compared with 2003 and 2004. This stems from the
collection efforts by the bank. From 2005 onwards
they started to rely more on REACH, making the
2005 dataset more comparable to that dataset. We
investigate the robustness of this in Sect. 4.3 below.
We employ different proxies for capital structure.
The most commonly used measure is total debt ratio,
i.e., the relative amount of debt (leverage), defined as
total debt over total assets. We also consider the
short-term and long-term debt ratio separately. Def-
initions and descriptive statistics are presented in
Table 2. Debt is measured by its book value. Market
values are not known for SMEs, such that most SME
managers have to base their financing decisions on
book values. For short-term debt, we include bank
loans and other short-term debt.2 Following other
studies, we excluded trade credit as it does not carry
an explicit interest rate and is under the influence of
completely different determinants (for example, de
Jong et al. (2008) focus for that reason only on long-
term debt in their cross-country analysis of the
determinants of capital structure, and do entirely drop
short-term debt).
Table 2 shows that Dutch SMEs have more long-
terms loans than short-term loans (63% of total debt
is long-term debt). These numbers are in contrast to
those of Hall et al. (2004), who report an average
long-term debt level of 2% for Dutch SMEs. This
difference can be explained as follows. The long-term
debt definition in our dataset is based upon loans
given with a long maturity but not necessarily a long
duration. That is, some short-term loans may be
classified as long-term debt as the debt is given
within the framework of a line of credit but with a
revisable loan rate. We further checked with previous
work that focused on the capital structure of Dutch
firms. For example, Chen et al. (1999) report a long-
term to total credit ratio of 77%. Our numbers are in
the same ballpark, showing that the Hall et al. (2004)
results on short-term versus long-term debt should be
seen as an outlier. The descriptive statistics in
Table 2 also differ from those of other countries.
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Definition Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Dependent variables
Total debt total debt/total assets 0.492 0.246 0 1.659
Long-term debt long-term debt/total assets 0.308 0.252 0 1.452
Short-term debt short-term debt/total assets 0.184 0.162 0 0.993
Firm characteristics
Size (log) log of total assets 6.045 1.318 0.693 9.171
Tangible assets tangible fixed assets/total assets 0.487 0.288 0 1
Net debtors (debtors - creditors)/total assets 0.046 0.146 -0.534 0.587
ROA EBITD/total assets 0.153 0.322 -14.00 7.286
Intangible assets intangible assets/total assets 0.017 0.066 -0.308 1
Growth (assets) [tot. assets(t) - tot. assets(t - 1)]/tot. assets(t - 1) 0.133 0.437 -0.599 3.300
Tax rate taxes paid/earnings before tax 0.094 0.173 -0.362 0.771
Depreciation depreciation expense/total assets 0.179 0.070 0 1
Industries
Manufacturing, construction, wholesale trade, retail trade food, retail trade nonfood, catering and leisure, transport, services
Notes: The amount of taxes paid is not directly observed. The amount is derived by multiplying the return on equity (which is based
on profits after tax) by the amount of equity. This gives profits after taxes. Deducting this from profits before tax gives an implied
measure of taxes paid. Bank-strategic reasons prevent us from reporting the descriptive statistics on specific industries. ROA, return
on assets; EBITD, earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation
2 In a previous version of the paper we employed only short-
term bank debt. The empirical results were qualitatively similar.
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Sogorb-Mira (2005) reports for Spanish SMEs that
15% of total debt is long-term debt, and Michaelas
et al. (1999) find for UK SMEs that the ratio is 29%.
Table 2 also provides descriptive statistics on our
determinants of capital structure: firm size, tangible
fixed assets, net debtors, profitability, intangible
assets, asset growth, effective corporate tax rate,
depreciation, and industry characteristics. Firm size is
measured as the log of total assets. A measure for asset
structure is tangible assets. Tangible assets are all
fixed assets except intangible fixed assets and inven-
tories (Titman and Wessels 1988; Sogorb-Mira 2005).
As opposed to real estate and equipment, inventories
are short-term assets and therefore expected to be poor
collateral. Net debtors is measured by the difference
between debtors and creditors, scaled by total assets
(Michaelas et al. 1999). Table 2 shows that the firms
in our sample have much more tangible than intan-
gible assets. In addition, on average, net debtors is
small. To measure the effect of profitability, we use
return on assets (ROA), which is defined as earnings
before interest, taxes, and depreciation (EBITD)
scaled by total assets. The profit numbers of nonin-
corporated business are corrected for an owner’s
wage.3 Depreciation is not deducted in all empirical
studies, but if the aim is to test how managers change
their debt position with profits, managers will very
likely take into account the cash position. Moreover,
depreciation is already used as a measure for nondebt
tax shield. The proxy for growth opportunities is
intangible assets scaled by total assets (Michaelas
et al. 1999; Sogorb-Mira 2005). Intangible assets refer
to assets that are expected to pay off in the future, such
as brand names, goodwill, or research and develop-
ment expenses. Current growth is measured by the
relative yearly change in total assets, implying that the
first year of our analysis becomes 2003. We have data
on eight industries. Bank-strategic reasons however
prevent us from reporting descriptive statistics on
those industries.
The effective corporate tax is measured as the
amount of company taxes divided by the profit before
tax. This variable is not scaled by total assets, since
the amount of taxes depends on profits. Nondebt tax
shields lower taxable income and can therefore
substitute for the tax benefits of debt. Titman and
Wessels (1988) introduced depreciation as a proxy
for nondebt tax shields, but did not find significant
effects. A problem with depreciation as a proxy for
nondebt tax shields is that it can also be an indicator
for fixed assets. Van Dijk (1997) reported a high
correlation (i.e., 0.495) between depreciation and
fixed assets. Since he finds a significant negative
relationship between depreciation and leverage, he
argues that it is unlikely that a firm’s collateral value
(for which depreciation can be a proxy as well) has a
positive influence on leverage. Nevertheless, depre-
ciation was used in many other empirical studies
(e.g., Fama and French 2002; Sogorb-Mira 2005).
Table 3 shows the correlations between all vari-
ables of interest. As expected, there is a large
correlation between long-term debt and total debt. In
addition, the highest correlation is between long-term
debt and tangible assets, suggesting that long-term
debt goes together with physical collateral. Tangible
assets and intangible assets exhibit a slightly negative
correlation (-0.185), suggesting that they are (weak)
substitutes. The other correlations are quite low,
showing that multicollinearity is not a concern.
3.2 Econometric model
We employ panel data analysis, as our dataset
includes observations over several years. Some firms
appear twice, while others appear for all 4 years,
which makes the dataset unbalanced. We index all
variables with an i for the individual (i = 1,…, N)
and a t for the time period (t = 1,…, T). Depending
upon our model below, the individuals i may be firms
or industries. The general static panel data regression
model can then be written as
yit ¼ b0 þ x0itb þ eit; i ¼ 1; . . .; N and t ¼ 1; . . .; T ;
ð3:1Þ
where xit is a K-dimensional vector of explanatory
variables, which does not contain an intercept term.
This model imposes that the intercept b0 and the
slope coefficients in b are identical for all individuals
(i.e., firms or industries) and time periods.
A frequently employed panel data model assumes
that eit = ai ? uit, where ai denotes the unobservable
individual-specific effect (i.e., industry or firm) that is
time invariant, and uit is the random error. In our
3 Net profit (before tax) of nonincorporated firms has been
adjusted with a proxy for the average Dutch income for a small
business director, which is € 40,000.
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empirical analysis we assume a fixed-effects model
for the unobservable individual effects for two
reasons. First, the fixed-effects model introduces an
individual-specific intercept term (i.e., firm specific
or industry specific) that could capture specific
entrepreneurial skills or industry-specific factors.
Berger and Udell (2006), for example, argue that
the management capabilities of the entrepreneur are a
crucial factor in SME financing. We follow the
approach of several SME capital structure studies
which also use a fixed-effects panel data model (Van
der Wijst and Thurik 1993; Michaelas et al. 1999;
Sogorb-Mira 2005). Second, the nature of the unob-
served effects has been statistically verified with a
(not reported) Hausman test. This test rejects the null
hypothesis that the explanatory variables and the
individual effects (i.e., firm or industry) are uncorre-
lated. A fixed-effects model can cope with correlation
between explanatory variables and individual effects
(i.e., firm or industry) and therefore it is statistically
preferred (see also Verbeek 2008, pp. 367–369).
4 Empirical results
Section 4.1 discusses the results on the firm charac-
teristics as drivers of capital structure, using the entire
sample pooling all industries. The results of the
industry characteristics are discussed in Sect. 4.2.
Section 4.3 investigates the issue of limited liability
and summarizes the results of several robustness
checks.
4.1 Firm characteristics
The results of panel data regressions for total debt,
long-term debt, and short-term debt are reported in
Table 4. All regressions include seven industry fixed
effects to which we turn in Sect. 4.2.
In all models, most of the individual variables are
statistically significant. The estimates presented in
Table 4 confirm proposition P1, as larger firms
exhibit higher leverage. A one standard deviation
change in log size implies a 3.03 percentage point
increase in the ratio of total debt to total assets.
Proposition P3a is confirmed as well: the coefficient
for size in the long-term debt regression is positive,
statistically significant, and economically relevant.
Proposition P3b is rejected, as firm size appears with
a significant positive coefficient in the short-term
debt regression. Its economic relevance, however, is
very small. These results show that larger firms rely
more on long-term finance and less on short-term
finance. The results on total debt and long-term debt
are in line with previous studies on SMEs (see, for
example, Van der Wijst and Thurik 1993 and Sogorb-
Mira 2005). Larger firms are more aware of better
financing methods, since they employ more financial
and administrative staff and may have a stronger
bargaining position towards lenders.
Strong support is found for proposition P2 con-
cerning the positive relationship between total debt
and collateral. A one standard deviation increase in
tangible assets implies a 10.08 percentage point
increase in the ratio of total debt to assets. The




















Short-term debt 0.293 -0.359
Size (log) 0.101 0.114 -0.023
Tangible assets 0.389 0.604 -0.346 0.034
Net debtors -0.046 -0.157 0.174 -0.033 -0.182
ROA -0.064 -0.060 -0.004 0.033 -0.063 0.177
Intangible assets 0.050 0.025 0.038 0.042 -0.185 -0.004 0.031
Growth (assets) 0.016 0.020 -0.007 0.035 -0.047 0.017 0.026 0.018
Tax rate -0.111 -0.182 0.114 0.427 -0.225 0.129 0.023 0.090 0.017
Depreciation 0.049 0.011 0.058 -0.347 0.154 0.047 0.155 0.091 -0.178 -0.123
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interpretation of a change is such that it is induced by
the numerator and that total assets as a scaling
variable remains unaffected. Collateral is very impor-
tant for SMEs, since it helps to overcome informa-
tional problems. The positive effect on total debt
stems entirely from long-term debt, as short-term
debt is negatively affected by collateral, partly
confirming proposition P2a. Since collateral is a
way to mitigate risk of SMEs, these firms can fully
use their collateral to attract long-term debt. For the
firm, the costs of long-term debt are lower because
banks charge (relatively) higher interest rates on
short-term loans. These findings are in accordance
with the maturity-matching principle that long-term
assets are financed with long-term financing and
short-term assets are financed with short-term funds.
There is also strong support for propositions P3
and P3a. Net debtors, financed with both long-term
and short-term debt, positively affect the total debt
level. Firms with low net debtors have lower debt
ratios (ceteris paribus). A one standard deviation
decrease in net debtors lowers the debt ratio by about
2.4 percentage points. The empirical results show that
the effect is only statistically significant and positive
for short-term debt. This also provides evidence for
the maturity-matching principle.
Profitability is negatively related to the total debt
ratio, and this supports proposition P4. A one stan-
dard deviation increase in ROA lowers the total debt
ratio by 1.3 percentage points. Debt levels are lower
if a firm generates profits. This suggests that SME
managers prefer internal financing first, as predicted
by the POT. The most likely reason is that they want
to stay in control and avoid debt as much as possible
(Vos et al. 2007). This result shows that the agency
problem of free cash flow is nonexistent in SMEs,
because they do not have public equity and typically
ownership is concentrated. We investigate this further
in Sect. 4.3. The negative relationship between
profitability and debt is only significant for short-
term debt, providing support for proposition P4. This
finding is consistent with previous studies by Van der
Table 4 Industry fixed-effects panel regressions with firm characteristics
Total debt Long-term debt Short-term debt
Estimate Std. error Estimate Std. error Estimate Std. error
Firm characteristics
Size (log) 0.023* 0.0029 0.019* 0.0024 0.004* 0.0015
Tangible assets 0.350* 0.0278 0.546* 0.0148 -0.195* 0.0170
Intangible assets 0.486* 0.0449 0.631* 0.0456 -0.145* 0.0224
Net debtors 0.161* 0.0353 0.021 0.0114 0.140* 0.0346
ROA -0.040* 0.0155 -0.006 0.0047 -0.034* 0.0113
Growth (assets) 0.024* 0.0050 0.022* 0.0029 0.002 0.0055
Tax rate -0.109* 0.0281 -0.141* 0.0255 0.032* 0.0097
Depreciation 0.070 0.0517 -0.287* 0.0239 0.357* 0.0371
Industry fixed effects
Manufacturing Omitted Omitted Omitted
Construction -0.034* 0.0026 -0.024* 0.0014 -0.009* 0.0013
Wholesale trade 0.014* 0.0043 0.002 0.0022 0.012* 0.0030
Retail trade food 0.036* 0.0056 0.019* 0.0024 0.017* 0.0045
Retail trade nonfood 0.076* 0.0086 0.056* 0.0031 0.020* 0.0069
Catering and leisure 0.009 0.0059 0.008* 0.0036 0.001 0.0033
Transport 0.017* 0.0063 0.021* 0.0036 -0.003 0.0042
Services -0.009* 0.0007 -0.022* 0.0003 0.012* 0.0006
R2 0.202 0.422 0.156
Notes: This table provided the estimation results for Eq. 3.1 using the complete sample. * Significant at the 5% level. Variable
definitions are presented in Table 2
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Wijst and Thurik (1993), Cassar and Holmes (2003),
and more recently Sogorb-Mira (2005) for Spanish
data. Short-term debt can be amortized easily.
Support for proposition P5 on growth opportuni-
ties is provided, as firms with more intangible assets
have a greater total debt ratio: a one standard
deviation increase implies a 3.2 percentage point
increase in total debt ratio. The agency theory of
Myers (1977) is therefore not supported by the
results for growth opportunities. Support for the
POT, however, is provided by the results of growth
opportunities and asset growth. Firms with a lot of
intangible assets have less short-term debt and are
very well able to finance their future growth with
long-term debt. It is, however, important to note that
many firms in the database have no intangible assets
on their balance sheet (Table 2). Also comparing
economic relevance, tangible assets seem more
important. The results for asset growth do not
change the conclusion drawn for proposition P5.
The coefficients on asset growth are low, but a
positive effect of asset growth on long-term debt is
found. Therefore, our empirical results support
proposition P5, which is in line with Michaelas
et al. (1999). In the period under investigation
(2003–2005) the average total assets per firm
increased. The growth in total assets is mainly due
to an increase in fixed assets, which implies that
firms invested more and could attract external
financing for this. However, in the same period,
interest rates have declined, making it likely that
firms used that opportunity to opt for long-term
loans. Unfortunately, the effect of loan rates cannot
be studied more in depth due to lack of detailed
data.
The results in Table 4 indicate that the tax rate has
a significant negative effect on total and long-term
debt, but a slightly positive effect on short-term debt.
In particular the results imply that a one standard
deviation increase in tax decreases the long-term debt
ratio of SMEs by 2.4 percentage points (ceteris
paribus), while the short-term debt ratio increases by
0.45 percentage points (ceteris paribus). This finding
is in line with Michaelas et al. (1999), who also
report negative but small effects of taxes. A possible
explanation is that high taxes stem from high profits,
which in turn decreases the need for debt (Jordan
et al. 1998). The second measure of the tax effect,
i.e., depreciation, is not significant for total debt. It
shows a significant positive coefficient for short-term
debt and a negative coefficient for long-term debt.
4.2 Investigating industry effects
We first focus on inter-industry differences and test
proposition P6. The bottom panel of Table 4 reveals
that all industry dummies are significant. This shows
that all industries have a different capital structure
compared with manufacturing, which is our base
case. This holds for total debt, long-term debt, as well
as short-term debt, providing support for proposi-
tion P6. These results show that differences in firm
characteristics cannot explain all differences between
industries for SMEs. In other words, this is evidence
that some other characteristics of an industry are
important determinants of the SME debt ratio. The
industries with the strongest fixed effects are retail
trade nonfood and food, with 7.6 and 3.6 percentage
points greater total debt ratio than the base case.
These industries have a leverage ratio that is above
average, while important firm characteristics such as
profitability and collateral are below average. The
retail food industry is known for its low equity ratio,
since it is an extremely competitive industry. This is
probably the reason why higher debt ratios are
observed. The construction sector exhibits the lowest
total debt ratio. Interestingly, the results also show
that there is a fixed industry effect that differs in sign
between long-term and short-term debt for the
catering and leisure, and transport sectors.
In order to test proposition P7, we estimate a
model for each industry separately. We now include
both firm fixed effects and firm characteristics.
These industry sample regressions compute a coef-
ficient for each firm characteristic per industry
(results are presented in Table 6 in the Appendix).
Before turning to the heterogeneity in coefficients on
our firm characteristics, we mention that almost all
the conclusions regarding the hypotheses are the
same for all industries individually, suggesting that
the POT is most relevant for all industries studied.
To test proposition P7, we then investigate whether
there is significant cross-sectional variation in the
estimated coefficient for each firm characteristic.
The standard deviation of the cross-section of the
individual estimates for the eight different industries
is used as a measure for this variation. This helps us
to investigate whether the relevance of
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propositions P1–P5 differs across industries. In other
words, it allows us to investigate which capital
structure theories are most relevant for which
industries. Table 5 presents the estimates for the
variation measure as well as the results for the indi-
vidual Wald tests. These tests investigate whether all
the coefficients for a firm characteristic are equal
across industries. If the Wald test hypothesis is
rejected, the relationship is different for at least one
industry.
The Wald test indicates that, for most firm
characteristics, the relationship with the debt level
varies significantly across industries. This variation is
most pronounced and significant for net debtors,
tangible assets, intangible assets, tax rate, and
profitability. We are most interested in the results
for profitability and intangible assets, as these are
related to propositions P4 and P5, respectively. The
reason is that the TOT and POT have opposite
predictions. Table 6, in the Appendix, shows that the
coefficient on profitability is only positive for the
catering and leisure sector. This suggests that
the pecking-order theory dominates for the other
seven sectors, whereas the TOT dominates for the
catering and leisure sector. The effect of profitability
on leverage is particularly negative in the wholesale
trade, retail trade food and nonfood, and transport
sectors, suggesting that the POT dominates more for
these sectors. Also note that the retail trade food
sector is the only industry in which the effect on long-
term debt is larger than on short-term debt: profits
reduce long-term debt more than short-term debt. The
coefficient on intangible assets is positive for all
sectors, suggesting that proposition P5 applies for all
sectors. In other words, the POT dominates the TOT
for all sectors. The coefficient on intangible assets is
largest for the transport sector.
Finally, we investigate the role of intra-industry
characteristics. We evaluate this by considering the
impact of the firm fixed effects on the R2 (R2 firm
fixed effects versus R2 pooled) for the regressions
studying the different industries separately. A reading
of the results in the Appendix shows two important
results. First, firm fixed effects are important in all
industries, suggesting that within-industry heteroge-
neity is important. As the F-tests clearly show, the
null hypothesis that all firm fixed effects are equal to
zero is rejected at all conventional significance levels
for all industries. These F-tests take into account the
difference in degrees of freedom between the firm
fixed-effects model and the pooled regression model.
Second, the values of the F-tests are highest for the
retail trade nonfood and transport industries, which
implies the largest increase in R2 (corrected for the
difference in degrees of freedom) after adding the
firm fixed effects. This indicates that, within these
industries, firm fixed effects which pick up the
individual variability in leverage ratios are very
important. This shows that industry competition, the
degree of agency conflicts, and the heterogeneity in
employed technology are important drivers of capital
structure. Unfortunately, as our dataset only contains
limited information on competition, technological
dispersion, or agency problems within an industry,
we cannot further explore this issue and leave this for
future research.
Table 5 Industry effects and leverage: variation of parameter estimates across industries
Total debt Long-term debt Short-term debt
St. dev. of estimates St. dev. of estimates St. dev. of estimates
Size (log) 0.012* 0.008* 0.006*
Tangible assets 0.084* 0.055* 0.047*
Intangible assets 0.117* 0.068* 0.099*
Net debtors 0.088* 0.069* 0.096*
ROA 0.062* 0.034* 0.039*
Growth (assets) 0.014* 0.010* 0.008*
Tax rate 0.091* 0.091* 0.032
Depreciation 0.132 0.065* 0.098*
Notes: This table presents the standard deviation of the estimates for eight industries as reported in the Appendix. The Wald tests
indicate whether the individual estimates are the same across industries. * Significant at the 5% level. Definitions of all variables are
presented in Table 2
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4.3 Limited liability and robustness checks
The dataset provides us with information on whether
a firm has limited-liability protection or not. Based on
Cole (2008), we expect that firms with limited-
liability protection have higher leverage than other-
wise similar firms. Such protection may also partly
capture a decrease in ownership concentration com-
pared with sole proprietorships, for example. To
conserve space, we briefly discuss our findings
without reporting them in tables.
When adding a dummy for limited liability to the
specifications reported in Table 3, we find that it is
not significant for total debt, positive for short-term
debt, and negative for long-term debt. This suggests
that limited liability only increases the degree of
short-term leverage. This is in contrast with the
results in Cole (2008), where he finds that limited-
liability firms exhibit higher total leverage (he does
not investigate short- and long-term debt separately).
We further investigated whether the firm and industry
effects differ between limited-liability firms or not,
by interacting all explanatory variables with the
limited-liability dummy. We find that the coefficients
on the firm characteristics are different for limited-
liability firms. In particular, total debt of limited-
liability firms is less exposed towards firm size, and
tangible and intangible assets. In addition, both short
term and long term debt of limited liability firms are
less exposed towards tangible and intangible assets.
This suggests that limited-liability firms have differ-
ent means of raising capital for (future) investments
or running their business, which is in line what we
expect for those types of firms.
We now briefly summarize the results of four
robustness checks. First, as indicated above, 2005
contains about 30% fewer observations than the other
years. We investigated whether the results for 2005
were different from those in other years by running a
model where we included interaction terms of all firm
characteristics with a 2005 dummy. We found that
almost all the interaction terms were insignificant.
Using a Wald test, the null hypothesis that the
coefficients of all 2005 interaction terms were jointly
zero could not be rejected. This indicates that our
results are robust to the reduction in the number of
observations. The second robustness check concerns
the maturity-matching principle. This principle states
that short-term assets are financed with short-term
assets. In unreported regressions, we add the variable
inventories, another short-term asset, to our specifi-
cations of Sect. 4.1. Previous studies such as Titman
and Wessels (1988) and Michaelas et al. (1999)
consider inventories as tangible fixed assets, but if the
maturity-matching principle is true, inventories
should positively relate to short-term debt and have
no significant relationship with long-term debt, since
inventories are a short-term asset. We find that the
coefficients for inventories are significant for both
long- and short-term debt, which is not in line with
the maturity-matching principle. Third, we replace
asset growth by sales growth as proxy for growth
opportunities. Our results are very similar to those
reported in Sect. 4.1. Finally, to mitigate potential
endogeneity issues, we ran regressions where we
computed all explanatory variables using lagged
values of total assets. Our results remain robust.
5 Concluding remarks
We employed a large, proprietary panel dataset to
study the impact of firm and industry characteristics
on the capital structure decisions of Dutch small
firms. Our results on the impacts of firm character-
istics are mostly in line with the predictions of the
pecking-order theory. SMEs use profits to reduce
their debt level, since they prefer internal funds over
external funds. However, if a firm is growing, it
increases its debt position because it needs more
funds, and our results show that this happens
according to the pecking-order theory. Furthermore,
profits particularly affect short-term debt, whereas
asset growth only affects long-term debt. Therefore,
this suggests that, after internal funds, long-term debt
comes next in the pecking order for SMEs. Short-
term debt is more expensive and can be amortized
easily.
Our results also indicate that both inter- and intra-
industry heterogeneity are important drivers of cap-
ital structure, in line with both pecking-order and
trade-off theories of capital structure. Our analysis of
inter-industry effects reveals that different industries
exhibit different degrees of leverage, in line with the
trade-off theory. The impact of firm characteristics
for each industry is mostly in line with the pecking-
order theory and this for almost all industries. Our
intra-industry results indicate that firms display
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considerable heterogeneity after controlling for firm
characteristics. This suggests that the degree of
industry competition, the degree of agency conflicts,
and the heterogeneity in employed technology are
also important drivers of capital structure. A more
detailed investigation of this is left for future
research.
Acknowledgements We thank two anonymous referees,
Martin Brown, Fabiana Penas, Bert Sikken, and Willem van
der Velden, for comments that improved the paper.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which
permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction




Table 6 Results from the industry-specific regressions
Total debt Long-term debt Short-term debt
Estimate Std. error Estimate Std. error Estimate Std. error
Panel A: Manufacturing
Size (log) 0.070* 0.0226 0.096* 0.0206 -0.026 0.0185
Tangible assets 0.390* 0.0508 0.519* 0.0458 -0.129* 0.0395
Intangible assets 0.365 0.2019 0.418* 0.1855 -0.115 0.1266
Net debtors 0.333 0.0479 0.080 0.0417 0.252* 0.0386
ROA -0.186* 0.0418 -0.069* 0.0320 -0.117* 0.0308
Growth (assets) 0.016* 0.0096 0.015 0.0093 0.001 0.0080
Tax rate -0.003 0.0173 -0.013 0.0148 0.011 0.0137
Depreciation 0.112 0.1487 -0.011 0.1347 0.123 0.1253
R2 (firm fixed eff.) 0.948 0.960 0.924
R2 (pooled) 0.172 0.402 0.150
FF test (p-value) 8.346 (0.000) 7.786 (0.000) 5.764 (0.000)
Panel B: Construction
Size (log) 0.080* 0.0243 0.092* 0.0217 -0.012 0.0144
Tangible assets 0.429* 0.0410 0.529* 0.0374 -0.100* 0.0304
Intangible assets 0.449* 0.1724 0.557* 0.1666 -0.108 0.0850
Net debtors 0.275* 0.0333 0.055* 0.0254 0.220* 0.0273
ROA -0.138* 0.0277 -0.023 0.0182 -0.115* 0.0205
Growth (assets) 0.027* 0.0093 0.026* 0.0091 0.001 0.0065
Tax rate -0.021 0.0157 -0.016 0.0146 -0.005 0.0140
Depreciation 0.288* 0.1303 0.081 0.1094 0.208* 0.0986
R2 (firm fixed eff.) 0.946 0.959 0.915
R2 (pooled) 0.231 0.410 0.104
FF test (p-value) 6.474 (0.000) 6.498 (0.000) 4.639 (0.000)
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Table 6 continued
Total debt Long-term debt Short-term debt
Estimate Std. error Estimate Std. error Estimate Std. error
Panel C: Wholesale trade
Size (log) 0.066* 0.0231 0.086* 0.0181 -0.019 0.0161
Tangible assets 0.344* 0.0579 0.494* 0.0487 -0.150* 0.0387
Intangible assets 0.491* 0.1234 0.689* 0.1327 -0.198 0.1242
Net debtors 0.372* 0.0403 0.069* 0.0309 0.303* 0.0377
ROA -0.241* 0.0353 -0.092* 0.0281 -0.149* 0.0325
Growth (assets) 0.019* 0.0088 0.011 0.0081 0.008 0.0076
Tax rate 0.006 0.0162 0.010 0.0149 -0.003 0.0144
Depreciation 0.154 0.1517 0.066 0.1197 0.088 0.1313
R2 (firm fixed eff.) 0.950 0.957 0.929
R2 (pooled) 0.141 0.398 0.141
FF test (p-value) 8.857 (0.000) 7.234 (0.000) 6.108 (0.000)
Panel D: Retail trade food
Size (log) 0.062 0.0556 0.123* 0.0510 -0.061* 0.0290
Tangible assets 0.445* 0.0813 0.494* 0.0914 -0.049 0.0647
Intangible assets 0.290 0.2517 0.433 0.2534 -0.142 0.1153
Net debtors 0.465* 0.1186 0.186 0.1043 0.279* 0.0900
ROA -0.151 0.0791 -0.042 0.0646 -0.109* 0.0551
Growth (assets) 0.026 0.0224 0.012 0.0244 0.014 0.0164
Tax rate 0.004 0.0377 0.015 0.0374 -0.011 0.0316
Depreciation 0.189 0.2495 0.069 0.2567 0.120 0.1686
R2 (firm fixed eff.) 0.953 0.955 0.908
R2 (pooled) 0.261 0.384 0.093
FF test (P-value) 8.069 (0.000) 6.933 (0.000) 4.819 (0.000)
Panel E: Retail trade nonfood
Size (log) 0.074* 0.0188 0.083* 0.0177 -0.009 0.0144
Tangible assets 0.312* 0.0424 0.495* 0.0400 -0.182* 0.0306
Intangible assets 0.321* 0.1496 0.521* 0.1570 -0.200 0.1054
Net debtors 0.430 0.0454 0.154* 0.0386 0.277* 0.0395
ROA -0.249* 0.0398 -0.095* 0.0297 -0.154* 0.0299
Growth (assets) 0.027* 0.0072 0.028* 0.0073 0.000 0.0057
Tax rate -0.016 0.0156 -0.018 0.0152 0.001 0.0144
Depreciation 0.396* 0.1364 0.188 0.1342 0.208 0.1142
R2 (firm fixed eff.) 0.955 0.962 0.930
R2 (pooled) 0.140 0.359 0.148
FF test (p-value) 10.570 (0.000) 9.267 (0.000) 6.579 (0.000)
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R2 (firm fixed eff.) 0.954 0.967 0.945
R2 (pooled) 0.176 0.402 0.192
FF test (p-value) 7.134 (0.000) 7.194 (0.000) 5.801 (0.000)
Notes: * Significant at the 5% level
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